Is equality intrinsically valuable?

Two problems arise when discussing the apparent value of equality. The first concerns the ability to define equality in such a way that it can be shown as prior to other moral constraints and thus foundational, and the second concerns the ability to prove its desirability given this foundational quality. Broadly, political theorists have failed to articulate clearly why equality is in an individual’s interests and why they should be treated equally. Instead proponents are charged with making base assumptions that equality forms part of a comprehensive moral doctrine, leaving us with a list of related moral commitments rather than a sound theory (Dworkin 1983 p.25, Kekes 2009 p.180, Kelly 2010 p.57) – equality is “an axiom from which other things can be deduced or inferred” (Kelly 2010 p.57) but no one can articulate ‘why’. It is argued that if the view of equality as valuable is defensible, these challenges must be met (Dworkin 1983 p.25). This essay will assess the worth of equality by looking at instrumental and non-instrumental versions of egalitarianism. It will argue that on the whole, egalitarian theory fails to defend equality in a way that separates it from other moral principles, and that the closest to a defence we can get is using the Original Position as an attempt to prove the intrinsic value of equality.

The principles of equality, in one form or another, are threaded throughout egalitarian theory; whether they be equality of opportunity, resource, welfare, or otherwise. In general, two strands have emerged; that of instrumental egalitarianism and that of non-instrumental, or intrinsic egalitarianism. Instrumental egalitarianism places the value of equality in relation to its instrumental ability to bring about other good outcomes. Resource egalitarianism – which seeks equal-as-possible distributions in wealth – would be a clear illustrative example of how equality is instrumental (Frankfurt 1987 p.24). Equal access to resources, say, money, enables people to actively participate in the market, which enables them to fulfil their welfare requirements, engage in social activities, and so on. In this sense, instrumental egalitarian theory is pluralist (Parfit 1997 p.205). The idea that equality brings about other good outcomes in this way is not unique to egalitarian theory – many other political concepts employ similar principles; utilitarian values hold each individual person’s utilities as equally valid and important and libertarianism maintains that people have an equal right to liberty, to give just two examples. Indeed, it has been argued that all generally accepted modern day political theory is actually concerned with the concept of equality in some form – and thus it clearly holds some special value. All political theories “merely differ in the answers they give to the “equality of what?” question.” (Temkin 2009 p.156). In these cases, equality clearly exists prior to all other political concerns; as the default position for many political theories – to a lesser or greater degree (Kelly 2010 p.59) – it could be argued that it is intrinsically valuable in some sense. However, these theories don’t view equality as valuable in itself, but instead view its effects as valuable – equality is merely a stepping-stone to a greater political idea, and so an intrinsic value cannot truly be found here. Non-instrumental theory is our alternative vantage point.

Non-instrumental or intrinsic egalitarians view inequality as bad in a substantive sense and equality as a positive moral stance beyond its ability to promote other good ends (Temkin 2009 p.156). Several views have developed in this area; that of equality as fair process, equality of outcomes and also of prioritarianism; each place a different emphasis on the value of equality – both in a sense of its value in general and also when it is valuable.

When contemplating equality at a substantive level, unquestionably, fairness plays a role. Indeed, our gut reaction to unfair processes or outcomes proves this point; our instinctive reaction is to declare, “that’s unfair!” (Scanlon 2007 p.206, Kelly 2010 p.57, Temkin 2009 p.157). One route to proving the intrinsic value of equality is through procedural fairness, which is concerned with ex-ante equality (Temkin 2009 p.161). If we find an un-level playing field instinctively and morally unfair, then we should aim to ensure that people have equal prospects – that the expected outcome for everyone is the same. Fair process could be achieved by lottery or other unbiased methods in order to achieve outcomes that cannot be determined by “morally arbitrary” characteristics (Rawls 1972). The question arises however whether this is actually an intrinsic argument for equality. Arguably, procedural egalitarianism is more akin to the instrumentalist arguments; the procedure is only necessarily fair to ensure good outcomes elsewhere – we demand free and fair elections with equal voting rights in a democracy to ensure our concerns are heard equally and in anticipation of good future outcomes, for example. What we actually care about is fairness here, not equality – equality is not prior to our other moral principles, but a consequence of other pieces of a wider puzzle. That said, there is still some value to equality, the aim of procedural fairness may dictate the necessity for equality because some people wield excessive amounts of power over others; the very rich dominate political systems, for example. In these instances, it may be necessary and desirable for equality to form part of a moral basis for the egalitarian philosophy in order to reinforce the fairness of procedure (Scanlon 2007 p.205). Even with this as the case however, this hardly proves an intrinsic and foundational value to equality as it still relies on other doctrines to come about.

It is practically difficult to make a clear distinction between ex-ante process and ex-post outcomes when discussing equality. Outcome egalitarians argue that what matters is ex-post equality and the comparative fairness of outcomes (Temkin 2009 p.157, Scanlon 2007). Again, we see that fairness plays a role in the development of our theory – what matters is not the outcome per se, but instead, the fairness of those outcomes. To illustrate the point; if two people earn a salary of £10,000, with person A living in the UK, and person B living in Rowanda, then it matters that A is earning vastly below the national average, and B earns starkly above the average, despite the fact that they earn the same, it would be judged both unfair and inequitable. Again we face the circular argument that equality holds no intrinsic value other than a subjective moral judgement, which in turn requires fairness to give it substance within a wider moral doctrine. We are no closer to showing equality as an intrinsically valuable asset.

Prioritarianism doesn’t seem to offer a response that clearly defends equality either. If we accept that egalitarians are necessarily pluralists (Temkin 2009 p.157), then we agree that a plurality of factors must comprise a moral code. One of these includes the humanitarian instinct to aid those that are worst off (Scanlon 2007 p.203, Temkin 2009 p.159, Crisp 2003 pp.751-761). Prioritarianism allows us to view our each of our basic needs equally, accepting that there is a marginal diminishing return to benefits and increasing returns to disadvantages (O’Neill 2008 p.155, Casal 2007 p.296, Frankfurt 1987 p.24). This however, does not provide an endorsement for equality as a universal paradigm, but again is arguably proof that there is intrinsic value to equality at some level, even in this limited framing of the bottom end of the scale. Ultimately, prioritarianism is about our desire to stop people from suffering out of compassion, not about some higher aim of equality in its purest form (Crisp 2003 pp.757-758).

It would appear then that existing egalitarian theory doesn’t provide us with a purposefully distinct view of equality as being individually intrinsically valuable, but instead, it is positioned in a range of other values. It is only valuable in either (1) that it leads to good outcomes or (2) that it is a by-product of other motivations, and thus not prior to egalitarian theory or foundational in this respect. However, much of the literature arguing against equality as a foundational principle seems to revolve around the argument of proof; political scientists simply do not articulate why equality is an intrinsically foundational principle that we’d choose to have. If the greatest weakness of the defence of equality is merely that it cannot be rationally explained through a proof, as Plato attempted with his defence of Justice in The Republic, then perhaps we can find a thought experiment to perform this role. Kelly (2010) assesses the debate surrounding equality in Locke’s Second Treatise arguing that, if Locke’s argument for equality as a foundational principal to obey is based on the threat of sanction from God for non-compliance, then this is a weak defence. This is a sound argument – if equality is proving difficult to justify as a foundation principle, making God the source of that principle is going to be even more troublesome. But nonetheless, this still doesn’t answer the question of why equality is intrinsically valuable, only that you should adopt it because of the threat of punishment (Kelly 2010 pp.61-67). Perhaps one way to try and prove equality’s intrinsic value could be to use the Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position (Rawls 1972). Behind the Veil of Ignorance, as rational individuals that don’t know their place in society, it is rational – taking into account each person’s differing capacities to reason and to have a sense of the ‘good life’ – that we would conclude that our concerns should be counted equally. Indeed if the Original Position works as a theoretical device, the same principles should be arrived at by one individual, let alone every head of household. If, under these conditions, equality in some form (like the difference principle) would be what we would choose as a set of principles – and I believe it would be – then it is reasonable to argue that prioritarianism and egalitarianism are based on solid ground and that equality, constrained though it is in Rawl’s theory, itself is of intrinsic value. Of course Rawl’s theory isn’t perfect, and has been challenged a great deal of times, but it is as close as we have gotten to securing a defence of equality without falling back on other subjective parts of a moral framework.

It appears relatively impossible to separate out equality from other subjective parts of a moral code without a sound theoretical framework behind it. The Original Position provides the starting point for that defence, even if the conclusions from it are not purely egalitarian in the sense of total equality. Without this however, the value of equality can only ever be positioned in relation to other frameworks, and egalitarian theory will not be able to confront adequately the opposing theory.

Bibliography

Casal, P. (2007) Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough. Ethics, 117, 296-326.

Crisp, R. (2003) Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics, 113, 745-763.

Dworkin, R. (1983) Comment on Narveson: in Defense of Equality. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1, 24-40.

Frankfurt, H. (1987) Equality as a Moral Ideal. Ethics, 98, 21-43.

Kekes, J. 2009. Contemporary debates in political philosophy. In Contemporary debates in philosophy, eds. T. Christiano & J. Christman, 179-194. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Kelly, P. (2010) Why equality? On justifying liberal egalitarianism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 13, 55-70.

O’Neill, M. (2008) What Should Egalitarians Believe? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36, 119-156.

Parfit, D. (1997) Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10, 202-221.

Rawls, J. 1972. A theory of justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Scanlon, T. 2007. The difficulty of tolerance: essays in political philosophy. GB: Cambridge University Press.

Temkin, L. S. 2009. Contemporary debates in political philosophy. In Contemporary debates in philosophy, eds. T. Christiano & J. Christman, 155-178. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

RE: Homophobic advertising on Transport for London bus routes.

I am contacting you in your capacity as Deputy Mayor of London in relation to the following news story that broke today in The Guardian and on Pink News:

Christian group’s anti-gay ads to appear on buses

Religious groups respond to Stonewall with ‘Ex-Gay, Get Over It’ London bus adverts

I also would like to draw your attention to this petition:

See the petition on iPetitions

I am under the impression that Transport for London are not in control of their own advertising and that it is administered by a third party, called Metroline, but I find the fact that TFL are going to be host to such an advertising campaign deeply concerning. I won’t go into a debate around whether being gay is a choice or not – it’s a complex discussion when it involves self-definition, as I’m sure you are aware – but the message that these advertisements displays is one of hate; that being gay is some kind of disease or virus like the Common Cold that can be treated, cured and that one can ‘get over’. TFL should have no part in broadcasting such messages of hatred and prejudice, just as it would not if these adverts were overtly sexist or racist.

Members of the LGBT community in London, and more widely, have the right to live in a city free from the kinds of hate and prejudice that groups such as those behind these homophobic adverts espouse, and I know that you will appreciate this, as someone who is LGBT, and want to act accordingly. As an LGBT male, and the LGBT Officer-elect of the London School of Economics Students’ Union, representing some 1,000 students who will identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual, transexual or queer, I implore you to take action to rectify this situation.

I ask that you use your powers as Deputy Mayor, and responsibilities for the transport network within your remit, to stop Transport for London from going ahead with this outrageous advertising campaign and ensure that the providers of TFL’s advertising – Metroline – be properly scrutinised and investigated for their decision to accept this homophobic advertising in the first place. It is right that we take action to protect the rights of LGBT people in London from further prejudice in what should be a safe environment to work, live and travel and I hope you will be able to support me in that.

Kind regards,

John Peart
LGBT Officer-elect for LSE Students’ Union

But sometimes, it takes one person, or a group of people to challenge the way that people think. The Gay Liberation Front was one of those groups. As a radical and revolutionary force, the GLF challenged social norms and threw the prejudices of the 1970s out in the open, taking the first steps of a journey that is still being taken today.

The GLF found its roots in late 1960s America in the wake of a riot that would come to symbolise the struggle for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer liberation. The Stonewall riots saw the first true resistance to institutional oppression of LGBTQ people; a routine police presence in a well known gay bar escalated into violent protest against state oppression of civil liberties. Democratic principles teach us that all people are created equal under the law but in 1970s America liberty and freedom of expression applied to some more equally than others and Stonewall soon became synonymous with gay liberation.

On both sides of the Atlantic, movements were stirring, riding the wave of enthusiasm that another society was possible. A society free of oppression.

The first meeting of the UK arm of the Gay Liberation Front was held in a dusty basement classroom of the London School of Economics in 1970. Only a dozen people turned up to the inaugural meeting, but little did they know that this would be the start of one of the most high profile, radical, revolutionary, and ultimately short lived organisations is gay rights history. At the height of the movement, the organisation was regularly hosting hundreds of attendees in the LSE’s New Theatre and coordinating action on a massive scale.

The GLF was more than just a pressure group. It was a movement. And it was more than just a gay rights organisation. The GLF allied itself with the women’s and black movements, and any movement that was struggling to fight against societal norms to gain equality. The organisation saw itself as more than a one trick pony and more than just a reformist group.

At the core of GLF’s vision was a genderless society. It was gender that oppressed LGBT people and only through the destruction of those gender structures could they be free. Reformation was not the goal of the GLF, their goal was revolution. The structures of society were set up so that men were masculine; they sought attractive women and dominated them and women were their subordinates. In such a society, anyone who challenged these norms were outcast. The GLF’s mission was to free society from this oppression.

This oppression had to stop and the worldwide GLF movement would stop at nothing to ensure they achieved their mission. In 1971 the organisation published a manifesto.

“We do not intend to ask for anything. We intend to stand firm and assert our basic rights. If this involves violence, it will not be we who initiate this, but those who attempt to stand in our way to freedom.”

The message was clear. Expect the unexpected, expect to be challenged and don’t expect the voices of oppressed minorities to go away. The GLF would try anything to shock society into a new world order and spark the structural revolution they so desperately craved. Idealistic, passionate and determined, these revolutionaries would not be deterred by anything.

Perhaps the most well known and inspiring action that the GLF took was an action at the Festival of Light; an event that was organised and backed by Christian groups. The church had long looked down on homosexuality – and still does to this day – and that made it a prime target for the GLF. To highlight the absurdity of the churches opinion, and the rigidity of the gender structures it reinforced, the GLF organised for dozens of protestors to dress in drag, infiltrate the event and pair off in same sex kisses throughout the crowd. The movement grabbed headlines and media coverage around the world with it’s innovative methods and strong political methods to such an extent that the effects are still felt today.

But for all it’s campaigning success, the movement came to an untimely end. Factions were numerous within the GLF, and they all disagreed about which direction the movement should travel. Both the US and UK arms of the GLF disbanded only a few years after their inception, the UK arm splintering into organisations that still exist today. Organisations like Stonewall and OutRage! only exist today because of organisations like the Gay Liberation Front. Their tactics may be more reformist, but these organisations continue to push the envelope in 21st century.

The GLF is probably one of the most revolutionary movements of our time. But it’s effect on society was not as profound as we might expect. Where the civil rights movement gained legal equality for black citizens, and the suffragettes – also based at LSE – secured the right to vote for women, the gay rights movement has had little impact on the day to day lives of LGBT people across the world. Whilst no longer an illegal act, the major barriers to society today for gay people are not structural but psychological. There is still a stigma to being homosexual in our society; there still exists a problem with people’s perceptions about the gay community; bullying is still rampant in schools and discrimination is still rife across all levels of our society.

The GLF catapulted the 1970s into questioning it’s approach to the question of gender and it’s very existence meant that today, people like me have a voice in society, but the job is far from finished.

That all changed this month as it was announced that the lifetime ban would be lifted and replaced with a twelve month ban; MSM would be able to donate blood providing they had no sexual contact with a man in the last year.

Organisations like the National Union of Students (NUS) LGBT Campaign and Stonewall have been campaigning on this issue for years, arguing that LGBT men should be treated no differently than straight men when it comes to giving blood; so when the decision was announced, it was heralded as a victory by many. But that victory is a hollow one; hollow because whilst it is now technically possible for gay and bi-sexual men to give blood, for most of us it won’t make any difference.

The NBS has admitted time and time again that the demand for blood is rapidly outstripping the supply they receive, and yet still the NBS is turning away LGBT men that are willing to donate and perfectly healthy. As an organisation, it has decided to continue to draw circles around sexuality and not around safety; as an organisation it has decided to keep reinforcing age old prejudices and to uphold myths about the LGBT community that are totally unfounded.

The facts are simple: forty-five per cent of HIV/AIDS transmission is through gay couples whilst fifty-five per cent is through straight couples. Gay and bi-sexual men are not any more of a high risk group for transmitting HIV/AIDS than straight men and taking blood from a sexually active LGBT male is no more risky than anyone else – there should be no ban at all! It’s simply not true that HIV/AIDS is a gay disease, but by continually creating barriers to donation for LGBT men, the NBS upholds a lie and broadcasts it to the world. This rule change might be a step in the right direction, but it’s just as discriminatory for the vast majority of gay men.

To give credit where credit is due, the NBS have attempted to acknowledge the truth about HIV/AIDS infection – it heavily influenced the new rules – but now Hepatitis B is being used as the excuse to stop LGBT men donating. Hepatitis B is one-hundred times more infectious than HIV/AIDS and one in three gay or bi-sexual men in London will contract it by the time they are thirty-five. Unlike HIV/AIDS though, is completely treatable and preventable with a free course of injections from your GP. As an excuse to still have a blanket ban, it’s pretty weak; if Hepatitis B is such a problem for gay and bisexual men – which clearly it is – why was this not the reason for the life-time ban in the first place? I’ll tell you why; it’s because the ban isn’t about science or safety, it’s about prejudice, and to claim otherwise is sheer naivety. This is institutional homophobia that we’ve accepted, put up with, and continue to see at every turn and enough is enough.

It doesn’t matter what disease they try and use to stop us from donating blood, the underlying tone is clear and it must be continually confronted until gay and bisexual men enjoy the same freedom to donate blood to save lives as anyone else. With the exception of obvious mechanics, there is nothing different about the way MSM conduct their sex lives compared to straight men. They can be just as careful – practicing safe-sex – as straight men. They can be just as promiscuous, or not, as straight men. They can hold monogamous relationships just like straight men. The LGBT community is not a disease ridden pack of whores any more than the straight community.

And it comes back to this idea of drawing circles. A gay man practicing safe sex can be excluded from donating blood whilst a straight man can sleep with half of the country without a second thought for safety, and yet the latter can still give blood because they slept with women and not men.

It’s about time the NBS get a grip and move beyond drawing circles around “gay” and “straight” and instead draw circles around “safe” and “not safe”. This is progress, but it’s not the progress we need. The fight for equality for LGBT people must continue.

Are majoritarian or proportional electoral systems better?

Electoral systems – the set of rules that regulate competition between parties and/or candidates during elections, that decide how vote shares map to seats in parliament and indeed, how the electorate express their preferences – have traditionally fallen into two categories; majoritarian – which include Single Member Plurality (or ‘First-Past-The-Post’), the Two-Round System and Alternative Vote – or proportional – like open or closed-list PR and the Single Transferable Vote^[1]. This essay will assess the consequences of each type of system, with relation to the formation of parliaments arising from each, leading to a conclusion that neither is more beneficial and in fact a third way is possible and preferable.

The debate in this field is diverse, with many scholars sitting on either side of the proverbial fence on the matter. The debate is heated and often exaggerative in nature; Lewis comments that “the surest way to kill the idea of democracy in a plural society is to adopt [...] first-past-the-post…” (1965, p. 71)^[2], whilst Rokkan claims that it is “simply impossible” to make statements about the benefits of proportional electoral systems compared with majoritarian electoral systems (1970, p. 166)^[3]. None-the-less, countries continue to adopt different types of electoral system in the hope of achieving the best political outcomes – but what are these outcomes, and are they a benefit to the citizens within those countries? Traditional argument tends to follow that choosing an electoral system is about an ‘opportunity cost’ or ‘trade-off’; you have to choose between parliamentary representation or government accountability, between cohesive parties or individually accountable politicians, between majority or proportional electoral systems^[4]. The suggestion here is that there is a linear trade-off between these two factors and they are mutually exclusive. Of course the crux of the issue with electoral systems is not the system itself, but the types of parliament and government that form because of the electoral system. Proportional electoral systems tend to produce minority or coalition governments, which will produce a very different set of political outcomes than majoritarian systems, which tend to create single-party governments^[5].

There are many perceived benefits to a proportional electoral system; representation gains are among the biggest of these. Because seats are allocated in direct proportion to the share of the vote, parliaments tend to be a microcosm of society, representing a broad range of interests, ethnic backgrounds, economic backgrounds, and so on. The principle outcome is that parliament maps, as closely as possible, the preferences of the median voter and the government that forms, usually a coalition of two or more parties, will do the same^[6]; the policy outcomes therefore, are most beneficial to the greatest number of people. This breadth is not witnessed in majoritarian plurality systems; Duverger’s Law showed that majoritarian systems were far more likely to create two-party systems than proportional systems which generated multi-party races (Duverger, 1959)^[7]. Having a two-party system does not necessarily mean that the preferences of the median voter are unaccounted for however, as in majoritarian systems, parties will shift towards the median voter in order to gain a larger vote share, and can be sufficiently broad to capture all of the political spectrum. The majoritarian electoral system and two-horse race can mean that representation is disproportionate in parliament, and in many cases the government can have a large overall majority even though they receive less than 50% of the vote. We see this in the UK, where with only 43.2% of the vote in 1997, the Labour party secured a landslide majority with over 63% of the seats in Parliament. Clearly under majoritarian systems, the preferences of voters are not expressed well enough.

On top of these representation benefits associated with proportional systems, there is a by-product in countries that suffer from long-running ethnic or religious conflict, like Northern Ireland, where a proportional electoral system – in this case STV – forces a power-sharing agreement in Stormont; parties have to overcome traditional religious divides and work together. With the exception of some dissident terrorist attacks, the peace accord in Northern Ireland is strong, arguably because of the choice of proportional electoral system that means citizens on both sides of the religious divide have representation within the Assembly.

There are consequences of proportional systems that might be less desirable however. Coalitions, by definition, require compromise, negotiation and debate to survive. If parliaments are formed of many small parties, rather than two large parties like in a majoritarian system, you can end up with a stalemate in government formation. Countries can go for months without a government – like in Belgium, where 200 days after their most recent election, a coalition agreement still could not be reached – but more than this, when coalitions form, they can be made of such divergent ideologies that they are incapable of agreeing on anything, with one partner vetoing the coalitions actions if the policy option is not within their ‘winset’ (Tsebelis, 2002)^[8]. Policy inaction, particularly when exogenous shocks occur, is a very dangerous thing; perhaps making majoritarian systems a better option.

The principle gain from majoritarian systems is government accountability because they tend to lead to single-party government. In a proportional system, coalitions formed of several parties have very little clarity of responsibility; governments are generally formed after elections and the policy outcomes are generally very different from those in the coalition partners’ manifestos.  When these policies are implemented and effects are felt, it is very difficult to know which parties to blame and which parties to reward and so, come the next election, poorly performing parties from the coalition will likely remain in power. In effect, proportional electoral systems can serve to entrench bad government permanently. Of course, the extent to which this occurs will depend on how parties approach the coalition process. If parties are following an office-seeking theory^[9], where policy will be very flexible so long as parties get in to power then the clarity of responsibility will be low; you could argue that this is exactly the situation in the UK with the current coalition government – albeit that this was formed by a majoritarian electoral system. When 80% of the electorate were against an increase in higher education tuition fees, why did the coalition, which should more accurately represent the median voter, vote to increase fees, and who, of the Liberal Democrats or the Conservatives, are voters to blame at the ballot box? At least, some would argue, under a majoritarian electoral system, you are more likely to get single party government and you are therefore, as a voter, more easily able to identify who is responsible for the policies coming from parliament. Furthermore, if the government is doing a bad job, a small shift in votes will equate to a radical shift in seat allocations in Parliament – though in countries like the UK, this means elections are fought in a minority of ‘swing seats’ and the rest of the country is not engaged fully in the electoral process, which is clearly a negative consequence. Another consequence of single party government and large seat swings is that you are even less likely to have policy that maps to the median voter; you are likely to have a skew, either to the left or right, and so again the trade off arises – do we prefer policy that maps our interest more closely – and so do we prefer proportional systems – or governments that we can attribute reward and punishment to – and so prefer majoritarian systems? Many political scientists would argue the former is preferable, notably Lijphart who argued that proportional systems were “virtually synonymous with electoral justice” (1984, p. 140)^[10].

But there is a third way. Several political scientists have suggested that rather than a direct trade off between these factors that the relationship is actually able to be maximised in a way not dissimilar from that shown in  figure 1. This can be achieved by creating small multi-member constituencies (Shugart & Wattenberg, 2003)^[11]. The system works because, principally, it decreases the incentive to ‘tacitically’ vote (Cox, 1997)^[12], it reduces the number of people able to co-ordinate around individual candidates and allow for a broad range of elected representatives whilst still maintaining a line of accountability. Both accountability and representation are desirable in parliaments and neither a pure majoritarian system, nor a pure proportional system can provide both. A small multi-member mixed electoral system however can reduce the unrepresentativeness of parliaments by 75% and reduces the ideological distance between the median voter and the government more so, whilst it only increases the average number of parties in government by one-half and adds one large viable party to parliament, and though coalition is more likely, it only includes two or three parties at most, not the same sort of fractious and broad coalitions that we see in Belgium and Iraq. (Carey & Hix, 2010)^[13]. Clearly a system that can give us the “best of both worlds” is the best option.

In conclusion, it is clear that in reality neither electoral system – majoritarian or proportional – will be better than the other, because neither give us the desired political outcomes we desire; they perpetuate the idea of a trade off. We should in fact seek a middle ground; a well designed electoral system should be able to combine the best of both worlds – high accountability and fair representation (Carey & Hix, 2010)^[14]. A mixed multi-member system with low district magnitude provides this, and I would suggest to you that the middle option is the best.

Does Hobbes’ employment of natural rights take him in an absolutist direction?

In this essay, I will aim to assess the political thought of Thomas Hobbes, through analysis of his work, Leviathan. I will explain his theory of human nature, leading to his views on the natural rights of mankind and ultimately, the link he creates between this and his view that absolutism, preferably centred in a monarchy, is the best form of government. I will then attempt to analyse this reasoning, leading to a defence of his theory.

Leviathan starts with Hobbes outlining his methodology for exploring human nature, or “The Science of Nature”; by breaking down humanity and politics into their smallest possible component parts, he can explore our base motivations and look at the inter-relationships between them, drawing conclusions about the State of Nature, and ultimately, good government. Book I dismisses the Classical notion that there is an eternal good or bad; something we can grasp and obtain knowledge of in order to better ourselves in a Platonian way.

“But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man” (I, IV, p. 39)^[1]

Hobbes asserts that there is no moral eternal concept of good and bad for us to grasp and to follow, but instead mere interpretation on a person-by-person, society-by-society basis. Further, he goes on in chapter VI to compound his accusation, claiming men are only moved to act by desire; “… there is nothing by Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth of Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving.” (I, VI, p. 40)^[2]. These claims lead us to a State of Nature in which men are individualistic, unsociable, and principally at Warre with one another. Hobbes says we find “three principall causes of quarrel.” (I, XIII, p. 185)^[3]; Competition, Diffidence and Glory. Man is naturally competitive because of scarcity, we compete for reputation and for security, and we trust no-one incase they try to take our property or try to kill us and we are suspicious of everyone because we are all equally capable of doing harm. The State of Nature then, is almost a complete State of War.

Hobbes argues, that in the State of Nature, we have a Right of Nature:

“The RIGHT OF NATURE… is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” (I, XIV, p. 86)^[4]

This Right of Nature gives man unlimited right to preserve himself and makes no obligation on him to respect the rights of others to self-preservation. The Right of Nature, our unlimited Liberty and our constant fear of a painful death makes the State of Nature inherently unstable, Hobbes argues; the State of War, acting as an adjudicator over disputes, means there is no security for man and so we drive for peace (I, XIII, p. 84)^[5]. This peace takes the form of a covenant between all people to form a political society in order to provide what individuals cannot provide on their own and resolve the problem of our natural condition; we create the state to provide stability and security. This entire theory is in direct contrast with Aristotle, who believed humanity was naturally drawn to political community, because it suggests an entirely self-interested motivation for politics and is based on a model of individualism.

For Hobbes the contract between the people should be an alienation contract and should pass our Liberty and our Judgement to a sovereign power – preferably a monarch:

“His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order.” (I, XX, p. 132)^[6]

Hobbes argues that the problem with the natural condition is that we have a right to unlimited Liberty and we can reason our actions and judge them by what is in our best interests, even when this is in conflict with others, and so in order for there to be peace, providing stability and security, and ultimately the conditions under which people are able to self-preserve without fear of a violent and painful death, there must be one final judge of the Law of Nature. Hobbes’ assertion that there is no epistemological right and wrong which we can inherently know and learn from makes this possible; someone must set the boundaries of right and wrong and if the decision is not centred in an absolute sovereign monarch, we will return to the State of Nature as we are all self-interested and will interpret the Laws of Nature to our own gain. There must be an alienation contract which allows us to give up our rights to Liberty and Judgement, because these are the very things that cause us conflict in the State of Nature. This form of governance, where law is determined purely by the Sovereign, is now commonly referred to as Hobbes’ “Command Theory” (Austin, 1832)^[7]. We continue to obey the Sovereign because we formed the Leviathan and it is an extension of us but also, because we surrender our judgement to the Sovereign, we cannot challenge their decisions because they are the ones who judge – if they were subject to a higher judge, they wouldn’t be sovereign any more. Absolutism – unconditional and unified sovereign authority to which we have no right of collective resistance – and absolute sovereign power can be justified because the State of Nature is a near complete State of War, we are self-interested but seek security and stability and investing trust in an absolute Sovereign is the necessary condition for peace.

I will now assess some of the critiques of Hobbes’ work and show why Leviathan’s main thrust is correct. It is fair to say that the idea of an all powerful Leviathan has been a bone of contention for political philosophy and one of the largest areas of debate centres around political obligation – why would we obey the Sovereign and why would we centre the power in one person, when our natural condition is pushing us toward self-interest and diffidence? Hobbes’ central observation on human nature is that we all have equal ability to cause harm, however, creating the Leviathan makes all but one of us less powerful, and one significantly more powerful and able to harm us. The so-called “Grotian problem” (Grotius, 1625, 1609)^[8] gives grounds to this argument because of Hobbes rejection of the individual right to secession. Because the Sovereign is the final judge, and there are no real restrictions on his power, there is no exit option and we would arguably not enter into a state where our hands were tied, especially if it meant we had no real right to protect our Right of Nature. Later contract theorists like Locke sought to address this problem with the idea of explicit and tacit consent (Locke, 1948)^[9], but there are of course answers from Hobbes himself; in chapter XVIII he describes the Sovereign as a mere extension of ourselves and so the Leviathan would never act in a way that would harm the political society. More than this though, we are obligated to obey the Leviathan, not just because we are instrumental in creating it, but also because of Hobbes’ earlier claims that justice is keeping our promises despite our self-interested, egoistic motivations (Taylor, 1938)^[10]. Hobbes also says that breaking the covenant would be “against the reason of [man’s] preservation” (I, XV, p. 205)^[11] because he would not be accepted into any society; and so if societies that provide peace and security are ones ruled by absolute monarchy, man would be foolish to go against his only chance of guaranteed self-preservation. The contract ensures that man keeps his promise and overrides his self-interested non-compliance (Gauthier, 1988)^[12]. Warrander (1957)^[13] goes on to note that we obey the Sovereign because we still fear a punishment from the Sovereign, which as Hobbes’ argues is unfounded because the Sovereign would not ‘hurt itself’ as an extension of the body politic.

Aside from the obligation to follow a Sovereign, the terms of how that Sovereign should take shape is also hotly debated. Clearly, Hobbes favours a monarchy, and some political thinkers agree with this interpretation, including Goldsmith, who argued that Hobbes was correct in assuming that only in a closed system and with a single validating power can you truly get unity and peace (Goldsmith, 1980)^[14]. Hart (1961)^[15] and Kelsen (1945)^[16] disagree however, attempting to show that it is still possible to achieve validation when there is a division of power. They believe that Hobbes has confused the need to have finality within a regime and the need to have a final human authority, arguing that a set of written rules in the form of a constitution to constrain the power of the government can have the same effect as an absolutist monarch. This is of course totally missing the point that Hobbes is making. Hobbes believed that Sovereignty had to be centred in a single person, rather than a group – or groups – governed by a set of written rules because of Judgement. In democracies, for example, where there are many people to judge, there will be conflict of interpretation, necessitating the need for a single decision making authority. That can only exist in a monarchy. Moreover, a set of written rules can never be complete enough to not need interpretation, and if there is someone that is making judgements about the Sovereign’s actions, based on an interpreted constitution, then the alleged Sovereign ceases to be a sovereign power; Hobbes defines a Sovereign as that which has power to set limits on others, but upon which no limits are placed; and as you cannot get a complete set of objective rules that govern decision making, you must have a single, human, decision maker.

I conclude then that Hobbes was correct in assuming that the employment of natural rights takes him in an absolutist direction, because unlimited Liberty causes a problem of wreckless war, that without eternal moral standards we need someone to create and impose them, and that the only way to impose this is by creating a single absolute power, meaning we treat politics in a not dissimilar fashion to the way we treat religion, except in this case the Leviathan dictates the moral laws we abide by, not a holy scripture.

Well, there seems to be some debate about just how good an idea it is. From the very first week, students have been complaining about the new course and its not surprising, given what the School is trying to do with it.

First and foremost, it feels a little bit like the School is attempting to teach us all the social sciences while teaching us none. While that might sound a little counter-intuitive, bear with me. Because this course is delivered to first years across 37 departments in the school – a total of 1271 students – the course has to be pitched in a way that is accessible to mathematicians and to anthropologists (Is it just me that sees an issue with that principle?). You can’t design a course that fits that many people, all who applied to the LSE with unique expectations about what they want to study. I’ve heard people saying that they feel at some points the course is like a GCSE level subject while others argue they don’t understand an ounce of what’s going on. Moreover, LSE100 counts a whole 0 per cent towards your final degree classification. So whilst you’re sat in the Peacock Theatre, you can be safe in the knowledge that this compulsory fifth module is of no consequence to everything else you do. Then the administration wonders why people are questioning the relevance of the course when not only is it pitched poorly and counts for nothing, but more than that, for most of us, the course overlaps with content already on our respective degree programmes.

Now I’m not going to just sit here writing all the things that I think are wrong with LSE100, because, for what its worth, I actually think it’s a good idea. So instead, let’s get constructive.

Firstly, if you’re going to make me sit a compulsory module, make it a core module as part of my degree programme – don’t tag it on as a fifth and expect me to care about it because it appears on my transcript. Make it worth the effort! Most, if not all students have an outside option available in their first year – swap it for LSE100.

Secondly, because you can’t teach us all at the same level, as I mentioned above, make LSE100 customized for each department so I don’t study the same content twice. In the School’s defense, they’ve given the SSLC an explanation of why the course is designed this way – mostly money and inflexibility of the School as a whole – but whilst these changes might take significant investment, students will soon be paying anywhere up to £9000 as a minimum to study at the LSE – and they should have their money invested in a course designed around them.

Thirdly, get the timing right; don’t make me sit through lectures on writing skills in our sixteenth week of the academic year! I can appreciate why the LSE has timed this module the way that it has – we don’t feel overwhelmed with work in our first term and we don’t get burdened during year two’s exam period. But seriously, giving me a lecture on essay writing – that admittedly could have been pretty useful – when I’ve already finished all my formative work this year, is a little nonsensical. I don’t know about you, but if I haven’t figured out how to write an essay by week sixteen, you may as well book me for a resit now! Of course not everyone takes qualitative subjects so these skills aren’t useful to them right now on the course, but if LSE 100 is designed to boost our skills set, boost it right at the beginning so we can hit the ground running, not 16 weeks too late.

Now I could go on, but I dare say someone will write for the Beaver either commending or condemning my comments and elongating the debate, so instead I’ll leave you on this note: LSE100 is a good idea and a potentially very useful course. But the LSE needs to get serious about this. If it doesn’t, it will be seen as a laughing stock forever more, and they wouldn’t want that – not with all the money they’ve invested in those luxury embossed folders.

Now I’ll say this first off, until I walked in the room and started listening to the debate, I had no idea how I was going to vote. I had an instinctive feeling that this would be a bad thing to do, but couldn’t come up with any one valid reason to oppose the motion off the top of my head. As such, I was going to let it fly on by and see how it turned out (I would have probably electronically abstained to try and achieve quorum, but of course, there’s no option for that on the voting system!). Instead, a rather different thing happened. Daniel Kroop, the Postgraduate Officer for the LSE SU, opposed the motion and, for me at least, hit the nail on the head, and gave me the answers I was looking for. I decided to get off the fence and second his opposition.

There have been problems with the new voting system since it was first introduced. It isn’t very user-friendly as a piece of technology, on most occasions motions don’t achieve quorum – i.e. not enough people vote for it to be valid, and if you haven’t been to the UGM, the only thing you can see online to know how to vote is the motion itself. At the same time, UGM attendance has been decreasing on average, with the biggest UGMs only being ones where keynote speakers like the Director or the President of NUS is in attendance, so people can have a crack at authority bashing (For the hacks out there, thats normal person speak for accountability). Legitimate concerns therefore have been raised about the future of the UGM and the legitimacy of that sacred institution that LSE SU prides itself on. We’re the only students’ union in the whole of the UK that holds a weekly general meeting, don’t you know?!

And this of course leads to the question of causality. What caused a highly politicised campus, that has been engaging in SU campaigns in their thousands, to desert one of the ways it can control the direction of its students’ union? Clearly the proposers believe this is due to the change in voting system, and of course the logical solution to that is to change it back. Or is it?

I ask the question whether the UGM is poorly attended because people can’t vote at it, or because they don’t care about the motions being put forward; whether it’s because they can’t vote there, or because it’s an inaccessible monolith, filled with the same old hacks week in, week out; whether it’s because they can’t vote there, or because they find other ways to engage with and shape the students’ union; whether it’s because they can’t vote there, or because they simply don’t know it exists?

Now I don’t have the answer to those questions, and neither will the proposers of this motion. What I can tell you, is that as a member of NUS’ National Executive, I go to students’ unions, and I go to general meetings all across the country on a pretty regular basis, and all of them are struggling with the same question: why don’t people turn up to make their voice heard?

Most of them come to the conclusion its because students’ unions are too inward facing, don’t reach out to their members enough, and need to try harder to involve those hard to reach groups. And here comes the main reasons I decided to oppose the motion. It isn’t a broken voting system we need to deal with, its a broken culture at the LSE.

If you want people to vote for your motions, it will and it should take more than a 2 minute speech and 1 minute rebuttal in a room of 150 people. A students’ union can and should be about transforming students’ lives, but its their job to engage them in the way they want to be engaged. And I’m sorry, but a one hour meeting every Thursday is not an accessible way to engage the majority of students at our university. 4% of our students are part-time students, likely with working responsibilities outside university, you can’t expect them to have a voice with an “at UGM” vote. Some students at our university have parental and caring responsibilities, you can’t give them a voice with an “at UGM” vote. Some students aren’t fortunate enough to not need to work to supplement their studies… I could go on, but you get the idea. Online voting might not be perfect, but at least it gives everyone the opportunity to voice their opinion.

Not only that, the new constitution is all about widening the reach of the SU beyond the four walls of the Old Theatre. Assemblies might not be well attended, but they are there, and do we blame low attendance on the voting system, or because we’re getting something wrong as a student body making sure people turn up to them? And its precisely these structures that are meant to support students to have a voice.

In the long run, we need to stop considering whether we want to protect our traditions and start thinking about the people this actually matters to, and that’s the students that currently don’t have a look in; not because they choose not to turn up to UGM, but because they don’t know anything about the democratic processes of the SU or we’re having the wrong conversation with them. It’s easy to blame our failings on structures when in fact the problem lies much deeper and is embedded in the very fabric of our institution. People don’t engage with the students’ union’s democracy because they don’t know about it or its not accessible, not because they of the voting system.

In sum, and to use a timely analogy right now, it’s useless swapping the taps on the bath when your entire plumbing system isn’t working – you won’t get any more water.

I have written on the challenges of student engagement previously, after delivering keynote speeches to the DCQE at University of Portsmouth and QSN’s Student Engagement Symposium. You can read the articles here:

• Keynote: Challenges of Student Engagement
• Keynote: The Importance of Learner Voice in 21st Century Higher Education